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BLASTING THE PAST: A REREADING OF WALTER BENJAMIN’S  
THESES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
ABSTRACT
The text offers a reappraisal of Walter Benjamin’s Theses on the Philosophy 
of History (Über den Begriff der Geschichte; ‘On the Concept of History’) 
from the perspective of global politics today and its similarities with the 
socio-economic and political situation in Europe and the Americas during 
the 1920s and 30s; more specifically, the impact of crises on the erosion 
of trust in liberal representative democracy and the concomitant rise of 
mostly rightwing populist movements and their strongmen leaders, aided 
to a significant degree by the media, ‘old’ and ‘new’ alike. The purpose 
of the text is to draw lessons from Benjamin’s vision of materialist 
historiography for our current political predicament.
In April this year (2019), the Faculty of Media and Communication (Fakultet 
za medije i komunikacije, FMK) in Belgrade hosted a one-day scholarly aca-
demic conference, titled The (Post)Digital Age: Media, Business, Technology, 
Trust. The conference featured a selection of keynote speakers from the Unit-
ed Kingdom and the United States, including Andrew McStay of Bangor Uni-
versity (UK), Mara Einstein of the City University of New York, Christopher 
Hackley of Royal Holloway London, and Des Freedman of Goldsmiths, Lon-
don, as well as Lazar Džamić from the Faculty of Media and Communication. 
The keynotes were accompanied by a panel discussion between the audience 
and several prominent figures from Serbia’s academic and business community 
in the field of media, including Aleksandar Fatić from the Institute for Philos-
ophy and Social Theory (Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju); Goran Tom-
ka from the Faculty of Sport and Tourism (Fakultet za sport i turizam) at the 
University of Novi Sad; Branimir Brkljač, story-maker and founder of Mokrin 
House; and Uroš Krčadinac from the Faculty of Media and Communication. 
The panel was moderated by Danica Čigoja Piper (FMK). The main topics ad-
dressed in the keynotes and panel discussion included the digital as the first 
meta-medium and indispensable infrastructural paradigm of our lives in the 
21st century, including not only media, but also education, politics, business, 
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retail, and marketing, and much more concerning our everyday lives; the no-
tion of revolution in the digital revolution; the work of paratexts in digital 
communication; the ethics of Internet marketing; issues in empathic technol-
ogy, and much more.1
Following the conference, I was asked to do a brief interview with Des Freed-
man, one of the keynote speakers. Provoked by some of the issues he raised in 
his talk as well as a number of recent and not so recent developments in Euro-
pean and international politics, I asked him whether and, if yes, to what extent 
he would draw parallels between the situation in global economics and politics 
during the 1920s and 30s, especially in Europe and North America, and our 
present socio-economic and political predicament. Specifically, some of the 
parallels that came to my mind included the economic and other crises of the 
1930s and our own time;2 the erosion of trust in and decline of liberal repre-
sentative democracy throughout 1930s Europe (with a few noble exceptions) 
and even more widely today;3 the concomitant rise of typically rightwing pop-
ulist movements4 personalised by their more or less charismatic leaders, such 
as Mussolini in 1920s Italy and, to a lesser extent, Hitler in Germany, as well 
as, today, Donald Trump in the US, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Matteo Salvini 
in Italy, Viktor Orbán in Hungary, and many others,5 offering seemingly easy 
1 More information about the conference may be found at FMK, internet.
2 ‘As we find ourselves entering the adolescent years of the twenty-first century, it ap-
pears that we are well and truly living in the age of crisis – the Global Financial Crisis, 
the Eurozone crisis, environmental crisis, various humanitarian crises – the list goes on. 
More broadly, it is alleged that we are undergoing a crisis of faith in democracy’, wrote 
Benjamin Moffitt in 2016 (Moffitt 2016: 118). For more on crisis, real or perceived, as a 
major if not the main catalyst of populism, see also Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2017: 
100, 106 and Anselmi 2018: 37. Moffitt still ventures the farthest in concentrating on 
crisis as the main factor in the rise of populism, when he writes, for instance, that ‘if we 
do not have the performance of crisis, we do not have populism’ and that ‘the perfor-
mance of crisis should be seen as internal to populism – not just as an external cause or 
catalyst for populism, but also as a central feature of the phenomenon itself’ (Moffitt 
2018: 123).
3 For more on the current erosion of trust in liberal democracy, see, for instance, Bir-
git Sauer’s diagnosis of ‘a wider and deeper liberal-democratic crisis’ in the western 
world (Sauer et al. 2018: 159). For a detailed discussion of liberal democracy as the main 
target of populism, see Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2017. For discussions of populism’s 
threat to liberal democracy, see Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2017: 79–91; Anselmi 2018: 
41, 89; and Moffitt 2016: 148–152.
4 ‘These are good times for populism’, Moffitt writes in his book, titled The Global 
Rise of Populism (Moffitt 2016: 162). Similarly, Manuel Anselmi notes ‘a global populist 
rise’ (Anselmi 2018: 108), while Toril Aalberg describes populism as ‘an increasingly per-
vasive phenomenon in European politics’ (Aalberg et al. 2017: 3). For more on the global 
rise of populism, see also Mazzoleni 2014: 44, Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2017: 21–40, 
and Lochocki 2018.
5 ‘Most populist movements are initiated by charismatic figures that tend to become 
absolutist leaders and authority figures’, writes Gianpietro Mazzoleni (Mazzoleni 2014: 
45). In the view of Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, ‘populism implies the emergence of 
a strong and charismatic figure, who concentrates power and maintains a direct 
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and ‘common sense’ solutions (e.g. ‘Build that wall!’) to the crises and various 
social grievances of their day, whether real or imagined;6 their ‘solutions’, usu-
ally predicated on pitting an ostensibly inclusive but really exclusionary no-
tion of ‘the people’, honest and hardworking, against corrupt elites7 and var-
ious Others in Manichean, ‘us vs. them’ dualist incendiary rhetoric, whether 
targeting ‘international Jewry’, Free Masons, Bolsheviks, and others, as in the 
1930s, or refugees, immigrants, and other minorities today, and aimed at mi-
nority rights, checks and balances, and other mainstays of liberal democracy;8 
and, last but not least, the complicity, often knowing, of both ‘old’ (tradition-
al, legacy) elite, mainstream and commercialised tabloid media, seeking to 
improve their bottom lines, and ‘new’ media – wireless telegraphy, radio, and 
sound film in the 1920s and 30s and the Internet, that is, various media (web 
portals, social networks, applications, and the like) supported by the Internet, 
whose massive reach and, in our time, interactivity, virality, and lack of regu-
lation and ‘gate-keeping’ (i.e. censorship) have massively benefited the spread 
of extremist rightwing populist political messaging.9
Of course, many of these parallels have already been drawn by a number 
of scholars in political science, media and communication studies, and other 
fields. For instance, populist elements in Nazism and especially Italian fascism 
have been discussed by Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (Mudde 
& Rovira Kaltwasser 2017: 33) as well as Gianpietro Mazzoleni, who identi-
fies some of Europe’s 1920s and 30s populist movements with fascism when 
connection with the masses’ (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2017: 4). According to Mof-
fitt, the populist leader is ‘the key performer of contemporary populism’ (Moffitt 2016: 
16). For more detailed discussions on the centrality of leaders to most populist move-
ments, see Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2017 and Moffitt 2016: 16.
6 See more detailed discussions in Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2017: 68 and Moffitt 
2016: 52, 131–132.
7 For more on the populist construction of ‘the people’ and ‘the elites’, as well as its 
Manichean anti-elitist discourse, see Aalberg et al. 2017: 14–15 (‘the communicative 
construction of “the people” […] constitutes the undisputed core of populist communi-
cation’); Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2017: 5–12, 104–105; Anselmi 2018: 8 (‘A discur-
sive, argumentative communication style that is always Manichean’); and Moffitt 2016: 
107 (‘“the people” is not a pre-existing social group […] Rather, “the people” only come 
to be “rendered-present” through mediated representation, which in populism is usu-
ally linked with the image of the leader’).
8 On nativism and the exclusion of all Others in the construction of ‘the people’ in 
contemporary populism as well as das Volk in its 1930s version, see Mudde & Rovira 
Kaltwasser 2017; Lochocki 2018: 8–25; Moffitt 2016: 52, 149; and Herf 2013, 91.
9 Moffitt’s assertion that ‘the media are never just neutral “loudspeakers” for populist 
performances but are actually active participants, often presenting themselves as prox-
ies for “the people” and answering claims on their behalf’ is a compelling and succinct 
summary of this complicity (Moffitt 2016: 102). For more detailed discussions, see Mud-
de & Rovira Kaltwasser 2017: 103–114, Anselmi 2018: 81–86, Moffitt 2016, Reinemann 
et al. 2019: 6, Mazzoleni 2018: xv–xvi, and Wodak 2018, xvii–xx. For more on the Na-
zis’ use of what were then new media, see Etlin 2002: xviii; Tworek 2019: 99, 118; Hilmes 
2013: 201–202.
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he writes that some of them ‘ultimately developed into the Fascist parties that 
came to power in Italy, Spain, Germany and Portugal’ (Mazzoleni 2014: 44). 
Ernesto Laclau, one of the most prominent theorists who analysed populism, 
drew another parallel when he wrote that ‘[w]ithout the slump of the 1930s, 
Hitler would have remained a vociferous fringe ringleader’ (Laclau 2005: 177), 
just like today’s populists arguably owe their success to the crisis of 2008 and 
ensuing upheavals. Moffitt likewise notes that ‘there are historical precedents 
[to today’s populism] in totalitarianism, in which the leader functions as the 
embodiment of a unified society’ (Moffitt 2016: 63–64); ‘In both [totalitarian-
ism and populism], the leader is the figure that represents “the people”, bring-
ing together and uniting them against enemies’ (Moffitt 2016: 72).10 Regarding 
the advent of wireless telegraphy and radio in the 1920s and today’s new me-
dia, Heidi Tworek provides some interesting parallels: ‘Wireless was the first 
technology to reach vehicles on the move, the first to become instantaneous 
point-to-many technology, the first where physical connections were not nec-
essary to reach each receiver’ (Tworek 2019: 13). Further interesting parallels 
could still be made between the opportunistic love-hate relationships that 
1930s populists and their modern successors have cultivated with mainstream 
media, which they decried then as Lügenpresse and Systempresse (‘lying media’, 
‘system media’) much as they decry it now as ‘fake news’ and ‘enemies of the 
people’, unhesitant to use it to further their own agendas (Tworek 2019: 170; 
Moffitt 2016: 87) as well as the calculated mixing of entertainment and pro-
paganda on German radio under Goebbels and in today’s ‘infotainment’, etc. 
(Anselmi 2018: 81).
Responding to my question, then – to what extent would you draw par-
allels between the political and socio-economic situation in Europe and be-
yond during the 1920s and 30s and today – Des Freedman gave the following 
response: 
Any question that encourages us to think historically, making links, tracing 
continuities and discontinuities between different historical periods is likely to 
generate a more profound, a more complex account of the world in which we 
live. So, without wanting to say that these two periods […] are the same, I think 
it’s important to reflect on some of the similarities. And also, I think, by doing 
that, it helps us to think there is something that is both new, about our current 
era, but also something that we have faced before. 
So, in terms of that, quite clearly the rise of a form of right-wing populism, 
forms of propaganda and disinformation that were not invented in the digital 
era, but certainly were intensified in the 1930s in very powerful and disastrous 
ways, we should be learning from those periods and not just locating every-
thing as if it started in 2001 or even this decade. In terms of the rise of racism, 
10 For more on populist leaders’ self-positing as both ‘ordinary men’ and extraordi-
nary figures in terms of ‘embodying the people’ and directly channelling their general 
will, see Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2017: 43–64; Anselmi 2018: 8, 20; and Moffitt 
2016: 60–74.
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anti-Semitism, a distrust of strangers, of foreigners and so on, there are import-
ant continuities between the two periods and we should be learning, I think, 
some lessons particularly about the media, of how we should not let claims 
about the dangers of immigration go unchallenged. […] you can see some of 
that coverage in the 1930s in the newspapers in a way in which we see much of 
that in 2019 in new digital forms. 
So it seems to be very useful to learn the lessons of the 1930s and to act deci-
sively against those political forces […].11 
Motivated by Freedman’s response, I decided to use this paper not only as 
an opportunity to draw our attention to the disturbing parallels between the 
1930s and our own time, which I attempted to do above, as succinctly as pos-
sible, but also, in what follows, to offer a discussion of a short but famous phil-
osophical fragment from that era, bequeathed to us by one of its most tragic 
philosophical figures: Walter Benjamin’s Theses on the Philosophy of History 
(Über den Begriff der Geschichte, ‘On the Concept of History’), because in my 
mind, some 80 years later, Benjamin’s political re-conceptualisation of history 
still offers us a chance to learn from his tragic time, to learn useful lessons from 
the 1930s, as Freedman put it, and equip us with potent conceptual and philo-
sophical weapons ‘to act decisively against those political forces’, ‘something 
that we have faced before’. In his Companion to the Works of Walter Benjamin, 
Rolf Goebel asks: ‘Is our time – late capitalist postmodernity in the age of glo-
balizing politics and digital media – particularly destined to actualize Walter 
Benjamin?’ (Goebel 2009: 1). While I am not sure if our time is particularly 
destined for anything, Benjamin’s continued relevance today does strike me 
as evident. Writing in the same volume, Marc de Wilde described Benjamin’s 
thought in the Theses as ‘still valuable and relevant for us today’, as ‘a critique 
of totalitarian ideologies that, to this date, has remained unsurpassed in phil-
osophical depth and rigor’ (De Wilde 2009: 177). In what follows, I hope to 
show why, with regard to some of our most pressing political concerns today.
For reasons that I will presently make apparent, I begin with a quick 
biographic reminder. Walter Benjamin wrote his Theses during the final months 
of his Parisian exile, probably in the Spring of 1940 and only weeks before the 
collapse of France, followed by Benjamin’s own death by suicide in late Sep-
tember of the same year, in a failed attempt to reach the relative safety of Spain 
and from there emigrate to the United States. Published posthumously in 1942 
by Theodor Adorno and Hannah Arendt, even though Benjamin himself had 
never intended them for publication, the Theses are typically cited as Benja-
min’s last finished work. As Uwe Steiner notes, they ‘are emphatically thought 
to be Benjamin’s legacy not only on the basis of their place in the context of his 
writings, but more even in view of the historical circumstances under which 
they were written’ (Steiner 2004: 173).
11 An integral version of Freedman’s response is available at Freedman, internet.
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And those circumstances were truly terrible. While Benjamin was at no 
point in his life blessed with a tranquil existence – his ‘life was, by choice and 
circumstance, predicated on the perennial experience of dislocation,  exile, 
and ruination’ (Goebel 2009: 7) – his circumstances, financial and otherwise, 
were steadily deteriorating throughout the 1930s, until the catastrophe of Sep-
tember 1940. As a German-Jewish intellectual seeking refuge in Paris from the 
Nazis’ persecution of Jews in Central Europe, Benjamin lived there in a sort 
of double exile, often in abject poverty as well. Always a fierce critic of fas-
cism, which for him meant both German National Socialism and its Italian 
counterpart, Benjamin watched fascism’s peace and wartime gains with hor-
ror and alarm, which are all too audible in the Theses. However, the year 1940 
also saw the signing of the infamous German-Soviet Nonaggression Treaty, 
which in Benjamin’s eyes irredeemably compromised not only the version of 
state communism practised in Stalin’s Soviet Union, already damaged by the 
purges and show trials of the 1930s, but also the European communist move-
ment as a whole. ‘It was his disappointment with Communism that led Benja-
min to write the theses. His main motive was to understand why Communism 
had betrayed its cause by siding with Fascism instead of opposing it’, De Wilde 
writes (De Wilde 2009: 179), although one would probably want to qualify his 
‘Communism’ as ‘Soviet state communism’ or ‘European party communism 
of the 1930s’, since Benjamin, as I attempt to show below, remained a com-
munist, albeit perhaps in a utopian sense, to the end of the Theses and his life.
In my mind, familiarity with this historical context is vital to understanding 
the notoriously cryptic prose of the Theses. On an objective level, the prose is 
cryptic because the Theses were only a sketch, not intended for publication, 
but, as Esther Leslie nicely put it, ‘intended to say so much with few words’; 
their ‘cryptic, poetic references derive a language for thinking when language 
has failed’ (Leslie 2000: 175). And in 1940s Europe, language may have failed 
indeed. However, as I seek to show below, the Theses grow perhaps a bit less 
cryptic when read through the lens of Benjamin’s concrete and urgent con-
cern with Europe’s predicament at the time, that is, the seemingly unstoppable 
march of fascism (including Nazism) and the abject and complicit defeatism 
and acquiescence of its conservative and social-democratic, even communist 
enablers. As I try to show below, this shaped Benjamin’s perception of what he 
refers to in the Theses as ‘historical materialism’, which substantially diverges 
from its orthodox or ‘vulgar’ Marxist conception, embodying Benjamin’s im-
plicitly ambivalent stance on the Marxist conception of history.
Thesis I is a good place to start, not only because it happens to be Benja-
min’s opening thesis, but also because it incorporates the ambivalence noted 
above; it is also a famous instance of Benjamin’s ‘cryptic, poetic references’. 
Benjamin here tells the story of the famed chess automaton: a chess-playing 
puppet dressed in ‘Turkish’ garb, for which (almost) nobody is a match. In fact, 
there is a dwarf inside the cupboard underneath the puppet, proficient in chess 
and hidden behind an intricate system of mirrors. ‘One can imagine a philo-
sophical counterpart to this device’, Benjamin writes, positing the story as an 
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allegory of (his version of) ‘historical materialism’: ‘The puppet called “his-
torical materialism” is to win all the time. It can easily be a match for anyone 
if it enlists the services of theology, which today, as we know, is wizened and 
has to keep out of sight’ (Benjamin 1968: 255). Over the past 80 years, much 
ink has been spilled trying to decipher this allegory, from Gershom Scholem’s 
early readings, in which he interpreted the allegory as Benjamin’s break with 
historical materialism and, by extension Marxism, and return to theology and 
metaphysics, arguably in line with Scholem’s own interests and ideological 
positions, to the present paper and some of the works cited in it; indeed, 80 
years on, Benjamin’s allegory continues to fascinate. Is it, to the contrary, an 
acknowledgement of the conceptual supremacy of (Benjamin’s) ‘historical ma-
terialism’ over other conceptions of history? Or is it, perhaps, a thinly veiled 
irony, or suspicion, perhaps? For there is something not unequivocally posi-
tive in locating historical materialism in the puppet, an inanimate automaton 
operated by a hidden impostor, a ‘wizened dwarf’.12 And crucially, what did 
Benjamin mean by ‘theology’ in this and the remaining Theses, which ‘has to 
keep out of sight’? Out of whose sight? Presumably out of its opponent’s sight, 
sitting across the chessboard; but who might be this opponent?
I will address that final question first, as an avenue to tackling the other 
two. If, according to Benjamin’s allegory, ‘historical materialism’ is to be situ-
ated in the puppet, its opponent, in the Theses and the allegory itself, must be 
‘historicism’. ‘Historicism is the enemy’, Esther Leslie notes (Leslie 2000: 195). 
Benjamin explicitly names and subjects it to a severe critique throughout the 
text, most notably in Theses VI, VII, XIV, XVI, and XVII. As Thesis VI makes it 
clear, what Benjamin means by historicism is the ruling German, that is, Prus-
sian 19th-century conception of history, epitomised by Leopold von Ranke’s 
famous dictum that history ought to be told ‘the way it really was’ (Benjamin 
1968: 257), by objectively uncovering causal historical narratives in the past, 
mostly by studying written historical sources. Benjamin resolutely rejects this 
‘antiquarian interest in history’ (Steiner 2004: 170) and ‘the archival complacen-
cy of nineteenth-century historicism’ (Goebel 2009: 12), on two counts. First, 
because, as De Wilde correctly notes, following Ranke’s prescription means 
‘in fact serving the ruling classes’, because ‘the image of the past, as it is con-
structed and read in the present, is always implicated in a certain configura-
tion of power’ (De Wilde 2009: 186). Second, and perhaps more importantly 
for our purposes here, Benjamin also rejects historicism on account of its par-
ticular conception of historical time. In this long intellectual tradition, time 
is conceptualised as ‘empty’ and ‘homogeneous’, an empty linear continuum, 
through which the history of humankind, rationalised as irreversible progress 
toward the mystical endpoint of history as its telos, irresistibly unfolds. While 
Uwe Steiner is right that Ranke, for whom all epochs were ‘equally close to 
God’ (Steiner 2004: 172), did not subscribe to this idea of progress through his-
tory, it was taken for granted by subsequent generations of mostly nationalist, 
12 In more recent translations, the dwarf is described as ‘small and ugly’.
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conservative Prussian and German historians of the historicist school, led by 
Johann Gustav Droysen. Its philosophical underpinning can be found already 
in Hegel’s Philosophy of History, for instance, where history is conceptualised 
as the unstoppable progress of human consciousness toward (a strictly circum-
scribed) freedom, which the subject, led by God’s hand, leans to accept as his 
‘second nature’ (Hegel 1900: 18–19). A more materialistic version of the same 
metaphysical position may be seen in Adam Smith’s concept of the ‘invisi-
ble hand’, which allegedly guides humans in fulfilling their own selfish needs, 
whereby they also contribute to the general progress of humanity without nec-
essarily realising it (Smith 1920: 220–222).
While it might be objected that this metaphysical conception of history 
entails a blind leap of faith, Benjamin was more concerned about its disturb-
ing political implications. He addresses those implications already in Thesis 
VI, but nowhere as clearly and compellingly as in Theses VII, IX, and X. They 
concern historicism’s aestheticisation of history as a progress narrative, which 
inevitably imposes the present on us – however terrible that present might be 
– as a natural, inevitable, and therefore unobjectionable stage in its unfolding, 
if not its final outcome. The historicist idealises this traumatic past and present 
by always and only empathising with the victors, Benjamin writes in Thesis 
VII, thus perpetuating the suffering of the oppressed, who are left out, erased 
from this narrative in which not even the dead are spared. In Leslie’s apt sum-
mary, historicism presents ‘a mass of facts to fill up empty and homogeneous 
time where history passes by without human input, a tale of great men, like 
us but not quite like us little people’. Its central strand is ‘the conception of a 
continual progressive course of history as a pile-up of event after event. […] 
Historicism deals in empathy with the version of the historical past present by 
the ruling class. This past is closed to re-evaluation from the perspective of the 
oppressed’ (Leslie 2000: 195). In Thesis IX, his famous and extremely powerful 
reading of Paul Klee’s Angelus Novus, Benjamin posits history precisely not as 
a progress narrative, but as a ‘single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage 
upon wreckage into a pile of debris’ that ‘rises skywards’, from which the an-
gel of history seeks to avert his eyes but to no avail (Benjamin 1968: 259–260). 
When one remembers only the horrors of humanity’s alleged progress that 
Benjamin witnessed in his relatively brief lifetime – industrialised mass killing 
of millions of people in two world wars, aggravated by ruthless persecution of 
entire ethnic groups simply on account of their ethnicity – it is hardly surpris-
ing that Benjamin rejected a progressivist conception of history that implic-
itly stabilised such horrors as logical, natural, and inevitable. He saw fascism 
‘grounded in a dogmatic form of “historicism”, which represented the exist-
ing power relations as the only possible outcome of history, as its “fate” and 
“destiny”’ (De Wilde 2009: 179). In Steiner’s eloquent summary: ‘The catastro-
phe of Fascism which faith in progress had considered impossible, comes as 
no surprise to those for whom the course of history until now had meant not 
progress but continuous suppression’ (Steiner 2004: 171). Likewise today, 80 
years on, when history ‘keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage’ in the shape of 
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more wars and genocide, albeit more localised, and human suffering in general, 
which is already being exacerbated by the climate crisis, itself another product 
of humanity’s historical and technological ‘progress’ that arguably threatens 
its very survival, with our populist leaders doing nothing to alleviate it, Ben-
jamin’s rejection of this spurious notion of progress still rings true. Benjamin 
‘wants to suggest that the rulers who have ruled need not always rule’, to bor-
row Esther Leslie’s conclusion; ‘It need not go on like this. It must not go on 
like this, for this is hell. Progress, the continuation of business as usual, is cat-
astrophic’ (Leslie 2000: 168).
This is where Benjamin’s ‘historicism’ and ‘historical materialism’ part 
ways – in the latter’s rejection of the former’s view of historical past as unbro-
ken progress through the empty continuum of time. In one of his central The-
ses, Thesis VII, Benjamin writes: ‘There is no better way of characterizing the 
method with which historical materialism has broken’ (Benjamin 1968: 258). 
That method, Benjamin continues, is the progressivist historiography of his-
toricism, which has never ceased to empathise with the victors and margin-
alise the vanquished, upon whose oppression and suffering the dominance of 
the victorious has been predicated. Consequently, a large part of Benjamin’s 
own work in historiography, most notably in the Arcades Project, is concerned 
with the material lives and lived experiences of the downtrodden, the bohe-
mians of 19th-century Paris. But as Steiner correctly notes, Benjamin’s histor-
ical materialism cannot ‘be identified with its actual historical emanations’, 
that is, with orthodox or ‘vulgar’ Marxist historical materialism (Steiner 2004: 
169). This is because one of the axioms of so-called vulgar historical material-
ism is that history comprises a steady, unbroken, and irreversible expansion, 
or progress, of the forces of production, to which the relations of production 
necessarily, structurally, conform. This conforming is accomplished through 
revolutions, periodical upheavals that overthrow old relations of production 
and impose new ones. As soon as the productive forces have outgrown the ex-
isting relations of production, the latter must yield to their configuration and 
a revolution must occur. Perhaps the most explicit outline of this determinist 
and progressivist view of history is found in A Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy (Marx 1970: 21–22).
To that, one might object that revolutions do perforate the Marxian contin-
uum of time; but Marx, in fact, posits them rather as mere stages in the  progress 
of the forces of production. The only real stopping point will be the final rev-
olution, the destruction of capitalism at the hands of the proletariat. But that 
will also be the final revolution and, strictly speaking, the only genuine rev-
olution, which will finally liberate the real potentials of humanity, currently 
enfettered by the alienation of waged labour, itself predicated on the imposi-
tion of private property. In Marx’s view, capitalism is a special case, because 
it not only expands the productive forces beyond a level it can structurally ac-
commodate, but also because it begets its own archenemy, the revolutionary 
class consciousness of the proletariat. In this view, then, capitalism itself nec-
essarily harbours the seeds of its own destruction; its structural aporiae will 
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eventually spell its doom. This is what qualifies ‘vulgar’ historical materialism 
as a steady progress narrative, just like Benjamin’s understanding of histori-
cism, albeit with a clear telos in sight. 
Given the historical juncture that Benjamin occupied, it is hardly surprising 
if for him that telos was no more believable than it is for us today. The danger-
ous implication of ‘vulgar’ historical materialism, which it shared with Benja-
min’s notion of ‘historicism’, was its implicit naturalisation of fascism, if not 
as the telos of history, then as a historically necessary and inevitable stage in 
the progress of productive forces, regardless of its sheer inhumane horror. In 
Benjamin’s words, the danger lurked in the historicist imposition of fascism 
as a ‘historical norm’. While, admittedly, the Theses do not feature an explicit 
critique of the progressivist determinism of the orthodox Marxist conception 
of history, instead juxtaposing Benjamin’s notion of historicism with that of 
historical materialism – which is perhaps one of the most confusing aspects of 
Benjamin’s last work – the discrepancies between Benjamin’s ‘historical mate-
rialism’ and that of Marx’s classical writings are too glaring to overlook.13 That 
is why Benjamin asserts in Thesis VIII: ‘One reason why Fascism has a chance 
is that in the name of progress its opponents treat it as a historical norm’ (Ben-
jamin 1968: 259) – not merely due to Stalin’s betrayal of the antifascist struggle 
with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, but more profoundly, on account of ‘vul-
gar’ Marxism and historical materialism’s normalisation of fascism as a neces-
sary stage in its own progressivist view of history. That is why the Theses are, 
in Esther Leslie’s summary, ‘a late attempt to write a dialectical philosophy 
of history that denounces the content of inherited ideologies of progress’ – 
historicism and ‘vulgar’ Marxism or historical materialism alike (Leslie 2000: 
205). They voice ‘a bitter critique of political doctrines – vulgar Marxism and 
reformist social democracy included – whose theories of history and political 
praxis are united by forms of inevitabilism or secular forms of fatalism. The 
implication is that from their theories of history the victory of fascism was 
unforeseeable, and their political practice was inadequate’ (Leslie 2000: 169).
Instead of the historicist and ‘vulgar’ Marxist view of history as progress 
through an empty continuum of time, Benjamin offers his vision or ‘redemption 
of historical materialism’ (Leslie 2000: 200) based on the concept of Jetztzeit, 
the now-time. He introduces this neologism partly to draw a clear distinction 
between it and the present, Gegenwart, which are therefore strictly not synon-
ymous. While there is an inkling of now-time already in Theses V and VI, to 
which I will presently return, Benjamin withholds a fuller explanation of the 
term until the final five Theses. Here, now-time approximates a singular cul-
tural-historical object, for instance, the mourning play of the German Baroque, 
which is regarded not merely as a transitory episode in the progress narrative 
of history, as it would be in historicism or vulgar Marxism, but as a monad, an 
autonomous cultural-historical object addressed in its own right. ‘History is the 
13 For instance, see Marx 1992: xxvii–xxviii, Marx 1971: 120–122, and Marx & Engels 
1966: 68–73.
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subject of a structure whose site is not homogeneous, empty time, but time filled 
by the presence of the now’, Benjamin writes in Thesis XIV (Benjamin 1968: 
263). He then elaborates on the contrasting conceptions of time in historicism 
and his vision of ‘historical materialism’ in Thesis XVI: ‘Historicism gives the 
“eternal” image to the past; historical materialism supplies a unique experience 
with the past’ (Benjamin 1968: 264). This is partly how Theses V and VI may 
be understood, where Benjamin posits the historical past not as a narrative, as 
a story, but as a picture that ‘flits by’, as a fleeting image that ‘flashes up at the 
instant when it can be recognized and is never seen again’ (Benjamin 1968: 257). 
Narrativity is so deeply ingrained in our conception of history, that a non-nar-
rative history may be difficult to imagine. Indeed, in most European languages, 
Romance, Germanic, and Slavic, narrativity is etymologically inscribed in the 
word ‘history’, where it typically equals or approximates the word ‘story’. His-
tory must make sense as a story, as a narrative, even if that means cutting out, 
suppressing whatever does not fit – the vanquished and the oppressed – and 
thus perpetuating their suffering even in death. It is precisely this compulsion 
of narrativity that the (Benjaminian) materialist historian must resist, as Ben-
jamin explains in Thesis VII. Instead, ‘the materialist historian must blast spe-
cific moments of the past, moments that are in danger of being forgotten or 
marginalized by the course of history, out of the continuum of the […] “homo-
geneous, empty time” […] of universal history’ (Goebel 2009: 12).
For Michael P. Steinberg, this privileging of the moment, the Monad, image, 
flash, over the flux of narrative, is an index of Benjamin’s ‘moral homage to the 
past in its actuality’ (Steinberg 1996: 3). But more importantly, it reflects his 
interest in the past not just for its own sake (as in historicism), but as a weapon 
of political intervention in the present; ‘redeeming knowledge of the past, in 
order to act in the present’ (Leslie 2000: 168). In my mind, herein lies the gist 
of the final Theses, especially Thesis XVII, where he anchors ‘materialist histo-
riography’ in ‘a constructive principle’. This constructive principle involves set-
ting up provisional ‘constellations’, in Benjamin’s words, of specific now-times 
and using them as politically motivated allegories of the present. Allegories, 
not symbols, because an allegory does not arrest the flow of meaning between 
the monads that constitute it, does not freeze or rob them of their semantic of 
historical specificity. ‘Any person, any object, any relationship can mean ab-
solutely anything else’, Benjamin wrote in his Trauerspiel project (Benjamin 
1977: 175). Accordingly, Steinberg thus discusses Benjamin’s engagement with 
the German Baroque mourning play, as a staged mourning (and therefore final 
repudiation) of total sovereignty and political totality that were shattered in the 
Thirty Years’ War and an allegory of similar developments in German politics 
in the Weimar Republic (Steinberg 1996: 15–18). Perhaps we might then simi-
larly remember the 1930s in Europe and use that period for a provisional con-
stellation comprising that time and our own, as a politically motivated allegory 
of our present. It would perhaps remind us that some of what we are seeing in 
national, European, and global politics today – the seemingly irresistible rise 
of exclusionary rightwing populist politics on the wings of new media – is not 
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new, but must be recognised and fought and resisted, rather than normalised 
for the sake of a misguided belief in history as progress. 
The task of the Benjaminian materialist historian is therefore to wrest the 
cultural-historical object from the (false) continuum of (historicist or ‘vulgar’ 
Marxist) history and use it as a politically pointed allegory of the present. If 
the historian is successful in this regard, s/he will have exploded, in Benja-
min’s words, the continuum of history, which for him would be nothing short 
of revolution. This is because, as Goebel put it, ‘the presence of the past decon-
structs the totalizing master-narrative of linear, teleological progress’ (Goebel 
2009: 9). But this notion of revolution has little in common with the final rev-
olution that Marx envisaged, described above, which will break the materially 
real continuum of history only once and for all, after which history will have 
reached its endpoint, unable to resume. Rather, the revolutionary interruption 
(‘explosion’) that Benjamin sought is of a conceptual kind: not the interruption 
of the continuum of time but of the historicist construction of the continuum 
of time, a political intervention that must be continually applied and reapplied 
with no guarantee of success. That is arguably why the ‘past can be seized only 
as an image which flashes up at the moment when it can be recognized and is 
never seen again’ – unless a Monad is recognised as an allegory of the present, 
a now-time, it recedes back into the dark recesses of the past.
Therefore, the possibility of failure is fundamentally inscribed in Benjamin’s 
project of materialist historiography. In the opening Theses, Benjamin even 
goes so far as to posit history as a series of failures, missed opportunities that 
must be ‘redeemed’. That is the task of the Benjaminian materialist historian, 
endowed, like the rest of us, with weak Messianic power, the power to reclaim 
the missed opportunities of the past for the sake of building a less horrific pres-
ent and future. I would link this weak Messianic power back to the wizened 
dwarf of Thesis I, the hidden theology whose services historical materialism 
must enlist in order to win every time. Perhaps this is the theology that must 
keep out of sight, hide from the pseudo-objective rigour of historicism and 
the blind belief in progress of ‘vulgar’ historical materialism. The puzzling in-
vocation of theology in the Theses has caused some interpreters, starting with 
Gershom Scholem, to take it more or less literally; thus, for instance, De Wil-
de interprets it as ‘a theologically understood responsibility toward the past’, 
‘a theological responsibility to save the past from the forces of forgetting’, the 
‘theological origins’ of historical materialism (De Wilde 2009: 179, 181, 189). 
However, I would side with those readers who resist such literal interpreta-
tions of Benjamin’s theology. In my mind, Steiner is right when he asserts that 
Benjamin’s theology is not ‘to be taken à la lettre’, that the ‘theological concept 
of redemption’ is given ‘a profane interpretation’ in the Theses, as ‘the imma-
nently historical, topically political redemption of the unsettled claims of the 
past, of the victims and of the defeats suffered by past generations’, turning it 
therefore into an ‘anthropological-materialist’ and ‘political’ concept (Stein-
er 2004: 169–179). I would likewise agree with Esther Leslie when she asserts 
that Benjamin was ‘not concerned with developing or interpreting religious 
BLASTINg THE PAST396 │ Žarko Cvejić
doctrine in any sense’ (Leslie 2000: 173). For, Benjamin’s theology strikes me 
as strictly a politically motivated notion, seeking to redeem suppressed mo-
ments from the past in order to motivate and enable concrete political action 
in the present and future. After all, the Messianic power of the Benjaminian 
materialist historian is weak: it must be constantly negotiated and marshalled 
anew against the constructed but not for that reason any less totalitarian con-
tinuum of history, even though its success is by no means guaranteed. Benja-
min’s theological historical materialism or materialist historiography is thus a 
strictly constructivist political project, aware of and candid about its contin-
gency on an anti-fascist political agenda.
In concluding, I would briefly return to another point made by Marc de Wil-
de. While I do not entirely agree with his literalist understanding of Benjamin’s 
theology, I do find compelling his reading of Benjamin’s Theses as ‘a politics of 
remembrance’ (although not necessarily ‘originating from an theologically un-
derstood responsibility toward the past’). His notion that Benjamin conceived 
of his politics ‘as an antidote to National Socialism and Communism, in which 
he recognized the forces of a mythical forgetting’ (De Wilde 2009: 179) does 
strike me as worth remembering, especially if we seek to learn the lessons of 
our past, as I think we must, avoid committing the same errors, and stand up 
to the forces of a mythical forgetting of our own time, ‘act decisively against’ 
them, as Freedman put it in his response quoted above. Benjamin acted in his 
own time, and, tragically, failed, but the sheer relevance of his thought today 
suggests that his failure was not in vain.
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Miniranje prošlosti: ponovno čitanje teza O shvatanju istorije 
Valtera Benjamina
Apstrakt
Predmet teksta jeste preispitivanje teza O shvatanju istorije (Über den Begriff der Geschichte) 
Valtera Benjamina iz ugla globalne politike danas i sličnosti sa društveno-ekonomskim i po-
litičkim stanjem u Evropi i Americi 20-ih i 30-ih godina 20. veka; preciznije, u članku se ra-
spravlja o uplivu kriza i gubitka poverenja u liberalnu predstavničku demokratiju, kao i pra-
tećeg uspona uglavnom desničarskih populističkih političkih pokreta i njihovih autoritarnih 
vođa, uz znatnu pomoć medija, i „starih“ i „novih“. Cilj teksta je da ponudi određene pouke 
iz Benjaminove vizije materijalističke istoriografije radi uspešnijeg nošenja s našim trenutnim 
političkim (ne)prilikama.
Ključne reči: Valter Benjamin, istorija, istorijski materijalizam, istorizam, napredak, Karl Marks, 
alegorija, narativnost, istorijski kontinuum, fašizam
